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Analyses — Sourcing under Sanctions

This page is the directory of analyses for Sourcing under Sanctions: Judicial Urgency and Pharmaceutical Procurement Costs. Each AN-NNN page is anchored by a YAML frontmatter block that drives the generated index below.

This page is the directory of designs and results. For curated claims about the world — sentences that could go in the paper — see docs/findings/. For the testable predictions and their cross-references to AN pages, see docs/hypotheses/.

How to read an AN page

Each an-NNN-<slug>.md follows the same skeleton:

  • Frontmatter: identifier, status, hypothesis it bears on, script and output path, design block (sample, specification, FEs).
  • ## Question — the precise research question.
  • ## Design — sample, variation, specification, identification threats.
  • ## Results — headline number + table or figure, with a link to the underlying script output.
  • ## Interpretation — what the result means; confidence color with justification.
  • ## Follow-ups — forward-looking only; analyses not yet run.

Status. pending (scaffolded, not yet run or interpreted) → done (script run, headline + interpretation written, confidence set) → stale (superseded).

Confidence. 🟢 green (direct and robust for the stated question), 🟡 yellow (informative with caveats), 🔴 red (kept for the record only). Green does not mean cross-jurisdiction confirmed; it means the specific analysis answers its narrow design question cleanly.

Generated index

The table below mirrors the frontmatter of every an-*.md in this folder. The machine-readable index is regenerated by python3 scripts/gen_analysis_index.py and lives at docs/reference/analysis-index.yaml.

ID Status Type Hypothesis Question
AN-001 done · 🟡 causal H:urgent-costlier-less-competitive Does urgent procurement cost more and draw fewer bidders than ordinary procurement, within item, year, and buyer?
AN-002 done · 🟡 robustness H:utg-gap-selection-bounded How large is the litigated-over-administrative urgent price gap after Lee trimming bounds discipline selection into the administrative channel?
AN-003 done · 🟡 causal H:no-broad-same-firm-markup Within the same firm, buyer, and item observed under both urgent regimes, does the same supplier charge a sanctioned buyer more?
AN-004 done · 🟡 robustness H:thin-market-supplier-leverage Does the under-the-gun gap vary by formulary status and market depth, as the deep-market interpretation predicts?
AN-005 done · 🟡 descriptive H:lost-scale How does the observed administrative-minus-litigated price gap decompose into a quantity/scale component, a within-firm pricing component, and a supplier-composition residual?
AN-006 done · 🟢 descriptive H:supplier-set-reallocation Across urgent regimes within item-buyer pairs, how often does the winning supplier set change?
AN-007 done · 🟢 robustness H:utg-gap-selection-bounded Does the under-the-gun gap survive Rademacher wild-cluster bootstrap inference given few and uneven PBU clusters?
AN-008 done · 🟡 placebo H:placebo-and-dynamics Do never-litigated items reproduce the urgent-procurement price pattern, as a generic platform/time-trend explanation would require?
AN-009 done · 🟡 robustness H:lost-scale Within common buyer-item-month cells, do administrative and litigated urgent purchases differ in total quantity and repeated demands?
AN-010 done · 🟡 robustness H:placebo-and-dynamics What do the BJS event study and Honest-DiD sensitivity say about the timing of the litigated-urgency price pattern?
AN-011 done · 🟡 descriptive — What is the annual fiscal procurement-cost implication of the bounded under-the-gun gap, and how sensitive is it to the admissibility and spending calibration?
AN-012 done · 🟢 descriptive — How accurately does the regime classifier recover judicial and administrative urgent purchases against ground-truth purchase orders?
AN-013 done · 🟢 placebo H:placebo-and-dynamics Does the never-litigated placebo remain null inside buyer-by-class environments that also contain litigated purchases?

The classifier operates at the purchase-order/tender-notice level; the empirical analysis is at the purchase-offer-item level after classified regimes are linked to BEC item records; price regressions use accepted winning bids.