Target: Journal of Public Economics short paper format.
Body: Compressed from 5,263 to 3,800 words.
Literature review: Collapsed from 5 paragraphs to 1.
Heterogeneity: Moved entirely to Online Appendix.
New empirical exercises:
Placebo test (items never litigated): coefficient \(-0.020\) (SE = 0.032, n.s.) for negotiated prices, \(-0.031\) (SE = 0.045, n.s.) for reference prices. Falsification passes.
Supplier fixed effects (2,202 firms): 52% attenuation of urgency coefficient (0.051 to 0.025). With firm FE + quantity controls, residual falls to 0.011 (n.s.). Decomposes premium into roughly equal demand-side and supply-side components.
UTG Panel B: Explicitly framed as quantity channel --- sanctions distort the entire procurement environment.
Conclusion: Sharpened to two-pronged reform (expand admin mechanism + remove court-order signal from tender notices).
Maps: Enhanced maps with SIRGAS 2000 projection and quintile breaks for litigated, administrative, and ordinary purchases. New 3-panel comparison map.
Regressions: Administrative vs ordinary — 40 models (8 outcomes x 4 FE specs + LPM variants). Key finding: admin purchases carry lower reference prices than ordinary (-9.1%).
Manuscript: Restructured to 24-page body (under 32pp target) with 5 tables/figures inline; all other results in appendix. Added admin vs ordinary section.
MkDocs: New pages for admin vs ordinary results, maps comparison, and changelog.