# Analysis index — summary for scanning
# Full details in docs/analyses/an-NNN-<slug>.md
#
# THIS FILE IS GENERATED — do not edit by hand.
# Source of truth: YAML frontmatter on each docs/analyses/an-NNN-*.md page.
# Regenerate via `python3 scripts/gen_analysis_index.py`.
#
# Fields:
#   id:         an-NNN (sequential)
#   hypothesis: hypothesis slug or null
#   status:     pending | done | stale
#   type:       descriptive | causal | placebo | robustness
#   question:   one-line research question
#   confidence: pending | green | yellow | red
#   tags:       free-form list for filtering
#   file:       path to analysis file (relative to project root)
#   script:     path to source script (relative to project root)
#   target:     primary output path under build/

- id: an-001
  hypothesis: urgent-costlier-less-competitive
  status: done
  type: causal
  question: Does urgent procurement cost more and draw fewer bidders than ordinary procurement, within item, year, and buyer?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:urgent-costlier-less-competitive", urgent, motivation, prices, competition, causal]
  file: docs/analyses/an-001-urgent-vs-ordinary.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/50_v9_outputs.py
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_urgent_and_bounds.tex

- id: an-002
  hypothesis: utg-gap-selection-bounded
  status: done
  type: robustness
  question: Holding urgency fixed, how much more does the litigated urgent channel cost than the closest administrative urgent comparison, once selection into litigation is bounded?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:utg-gap-selection-bounded", lee-bounds, urgent, selection, robustness]
  file: docs/analyses/an-002-lee-bounds.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/40_utg_lee_bounds.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_urgent_and_bounds.tex

- id: an-003
  hypothesis: no-broad-same-firm-markup
  status: done
  type: causal
  question: Within the same firm, buyer, and item, does the same supplier charge a higher price under the litigated urgent regime than under the administrative urgent comparison?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:no-broad-same-firm-markup", within-firm, pricing, mechanism, causal]
  file: docs/analyses/an-003-within-firm-pricing.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/48_mechanism_evidence.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_within_firm_robustness.tex

- id: an-004
  hypothesis: thin-market-supplier-leverage
  status: done
  type: robustness
  question: Does the litigated-urgent price gap concentrate in thin markets — off-formulary molecules and shallow supplier pools — where suppliers retain leverage?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:thin-market-supplier-leverage", market-depth, formulary, heterogeneity, robustness]
  file: docs/analyses/an-004-market-depth-heterogeneity.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/52_market_depth_heterogeneity.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_market_depth_heterogeneity.tex

- id: an-005
  hypothesis: lost-scale
  status: done
  type: descriptive
  question: How does the litigated-over-administrative urgent price gap split between same-firm pricing and supplier-set sourcing, and how much of it is lost scale?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:lost-scale", decomposition, sourcing, pricing, scale, mechanism]
  file: docs/analyses/an-005-pricing-sourcing-decomposition.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/45_reconciliation.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/figures/fig_sourcing_vs_pricing.pdf

- id: an-006
  hypothesis: supplier-set-reallocation
  status: done
  type: descriptive
  question: When the same buyer buys the same item under both urgent regimes, does the set of winning suppliers change?
  confidence: green
  tags: ["H:supplier-set-reallocation", winner-switching, sourcing, supplier-set, descriptive]
  file: docs/analyses/an-006-winner-switching.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/48_mechanism_evidence.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_winner_switch.tex

- id: an-007
  hypothesis: utg-gap-selection-bounded
  status: done
  type: robustness
  question: Does the administrative-minus-litigated urgent-price gap survive wild-cluster bootstrap inference when the number of purchasing-buyer-units (PBU) clusters is small and uneven?
  confidence: green
  tags: ["H:utg-gap-selection-bounded", wild-cluster-bootstrap, inference, robustness, utg-contrast]
  file: docs/analyses/an-007-wild-cluster-bootstrap.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/44_wild_bootstrap.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_utg_boottest.tex

- id: an-008
  hypothesis: placebo-and-dynamics
  status: done
  type: placebo
  question: Do never-litigated items show a spurious negotiated-price gap that would indicate a generic platform or time-trend explanation rather than a litigation-specific effect?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:placebo-and-dynamics", placebo, falsification, robustness]
  file: docs/analyses/an-008-placebo-never-litigated.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/20_falsification_and_supplier_fe.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_placebo.tex

- id: an-009
  hypothesis: lost-scale
  status: done
  type: robustness
  question: When purchases are aggregated within buyer-item-month cells, do administrative and litigated cells differ in scale and in the fragmentation of repeated demand?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:lost-scale", aggregation, scale, sourcing, robustness, diagnostic]
  file: docs/analyses/an-009-aggregation-cells.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/48_mechanism_evidence.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_aggregation_cells.tex

- id: an-010
  hypothesis: placebo-and-dynamics
  status: done
  type: robustness
  question: What does a dynamic Borusyak-Jaravel-Spiess event study show after exposure, and does the Honest-DiD sensitivity survive deviations at the observed maximum pre-period scale?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: ["H:placebo-and-dynamics", event-study, bjs, honest-did, rambachan-roth, robustness, diagnostic]
  file: docs/analyses/an-010-dynamic-bjs-honestdid.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/43_rambachan_roth.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_dynamic_sensitivity_summary.tex

- id: an-011
  hypothesis: null
  status: done
  type: descriptive
  question: What is the annual fiscal procurement-cost implication of the litigated-urgent price gap, given the Lee-bound midpoint and an admissibility calibration?
  confidence: yellow
  tags: [procurement-cost, fiscal, lee-bounds, descriptive]
  file: docs/analyses/an-011-procurement-cost.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/46_procurement_cost_bound.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_procurement_cost_bound.tex

- id: an-012
  hypothesis: null
  status: done
  type: descriptive
  question: How accurately does the urgency classifier label purchase orders, validated against a ground-truth set, and does any residual error bias the regime contrasts?
  confidence: green
  tags: [classifier, validation, measurement, descriptive]
  file: docs/analyses/an-012-classifier-validation.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/49_classifier_macros.py
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_classifier_validation_v9.tex

- id: an-013
  hypothesis: placebo-and-dynamics
  status: done
  type: placebo
  question: Does the never-litigated placebo remain null inside buyer-by-class environments that also contain litigated purchases?
  confidence: green
  tags: ["H:placebo-and-dynamics", placebo, specificity, buyer-class, robustness]
  file: docs/analyses/an-013-litigation-specificity-placebos.md
  script: v10-causal-mechanism/analysis/65_h7_specificity_placebos.R
  target: v10-causal-mechanism/output/tables/tab_h7_placebo_battery.tex
